How is the political landscape evolving in key jurisdictions?
The traditional centre-right/centre-left divide
In many countries a traditional economic political axis - a centre-right/centre-left duopoly - survived for generations. Although power fluctuated between the two parties, these ebbs and flows had a degree of predictability for employers.
Traditional economic political axisCentre-left and centre-right parties: Generally, both embraced globalisation, encouraged migration (particularly of groups who would take up much of the lower paid work in booming economies) and promoted liberal democracy in the face of authoritarian regimes, not least the Soviet Union during the
Cold War.
Centre-left parties: favoured more regulation; a greater role for the state; higher taxes; and generally increased worker protections.
Centre-right parties: have been pro-business; pro-small state; and favoured lower taxes; and less regulation (though within relatively narrow margins); and generally reduced worker protections.
In the UK, for much of the 20th century, the working classes voted Labour (centre-left), while the middle- and upper-classes voted Conservative (centre-right). |
In the UK, for much of the 20th century, the working classes voted Labour (centre-left), while the middle- and upper-classes voted Conservative (centre-right).
France and Germany also saw two strong centre-left and centre-right parties. The US saw a centre-right Republican Party alternating in power with the centre-left Democrats. Canada, New Zealand and Australia saw the same.
Centre-left and centre-right governments can differ (though not dramatically) in economic policies and have generally adopted international/liberal/progressive social policies. They both have favoured a free market, globalised capitalist economy and, until the financial crash in 2007/8, economies grew, and the electorate generally become richer.
This free market pro-globalisation philosophy has relied heavily on work migration. This has included both migration in significant numbers to fill low paid jobs which employers have struggled to fill from the domestic market and migration of highly-skilled workers enabling companies to hire the best people from the international labour market. As electorates have become more hostile to immigration, this approach has been an important factor in the increasing unpopularity of centrist parties in many countries.
The centre-left Danish Social Democrats were amongst the first of the centrist parties to campaign on strict immigration rules under current Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s elevation to party leader in 2015. Other centrist parties such as the Social Democrats in Germany and both Conservatives and Labour in the UK have followed suit, embracing increasingly strict immigration policies to reflect the views of their electorates.
Centre-left
Centre-left parties tend to advance more left-wing economic policies than the centre-right, favouring greater regulation, a larger state and higher taxes as well as the progressive/liberal/internationalist values shared with the centre-right.
Their popularity has been mixed in recent years. Centre-left incumbent Democrats were soundly rejected by the American electorate in November 2024.
Keir Starmer’s centre-left Labour Party triumphed in this year’s UK general election with the second largest seat majority since the Second World War to take power after 14 years of centre-right government. The centre-left also governs in Australia and Canada and leads coalition governments in Germany, Spain, Denmark and Norway.
This could suggest that centre-left politics remains strong in some countries. However, closer scrutiny of the UK election results, and the centre-left’s unpopularity elsewhere suggests otherwise. Under the UK’s first past the post system, Labour’s large majority of parliamentary seats was delivered with only a third of the vote. The result was also generally accepted to reflect general dissatisfaction with the incumbent scandal-hit Conservatives rather than an enthusiasm for Labour’s centre-left politics.
In most other places with centre-left governments, support is waning though perhaps reflecting anti-incumbency views as much as any disillusionment with the centre-left.
Centre-right
Like the centre-left, the centre-right generally shares the progressive/liberal/internationalist values but favours more economically right-wing smaller state, lower taxes, deregulation, pro-business politics.
In recent years, the centre-right has been on the retreat in many places, often replaced by centre left parties (as in the UK) or under threat by right-wing populists. Traditional centre-right parties have in some instances shifted to embrace far-right populism. The US Republicans being the obvious example.
There is reason, however, to believe that we may well see a resurgence of traditional centre-right parties. But as with the centre-left, the position is mixed. The centre-right governs in New Zealand and leads coalitions in Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Ireland and Poland. Germany and Canada will see legislative elections in 2025. In both countries the centre-right is way ahead in the opinion polls and looks likely to lead the next government in place of the centre-left.
The fragmentation of the traditional political divide
The predictability the traditional centrist parties offered began to break down with the financial crisis in 2007/2008. The impact of low economic growth, rising inequality and global shocks triggered by the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine left voters increasingly disillusioned with the “establishment”. While this environment increased support for a range of alternative political ideologies, it does not mean, necessarily, that centre-left, and centre-right politics are necessarily a terminally declining force throughout Europe, North America and Australia/New Zealand.
Alongside the traditional economic political axis, a second axis emerged – based on social values. This axis divides politicians, parties and governments with progressive, liberal, and internationalist values from those with traditional, authoritarian and nationalist values.
|
New social values political axis |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Social value | Characteristics | Social value | Characteristics |
| Progressive | Pro-green policies; pro-technology. | Traditional | Conservative values e.g. anti-abortion/same-sex marriage/trans rights; opposed to green policies |
| Liberal | Pro-democracy; pro-political checks and balances; pro individual liberties and human rights. | Authoritarian | Pro-concentration of power in executive/strong leader; centralised political decision-making; sympathetic to authoritarian regimes (e.g. Russia); restrictive of public protests; pro-greater police powers |
| Internationalist | Pro-migration; pro-global free trade | Nationalistic/Nativist | Patriotic; anti-migrant; xenophobic; protectionist |
With this fragmentation, political parties cannot be labelled easily. Some political parties combine features from different sides of the axis. Some also combine features across a characteristic. For example, more and more political parties advocate barrier-free international trade with relatively restrictive immigration policies straddling both internationalist and nationalist characteristics. Even within a policy area such as migration, a party may adopt a restrictive approach to migration for lower-skilled work and encourage highly-skilled migrants. Australia, Canada and the UK are examples of countries competing to attract highly-skilled migrants whilst adopting increasingly restrictive policies for low paid work migration.
The rise in populism
Politicians, political parties and governments need not only to be assessed against these economic and social political axes but also by the extent to which they can be said to be “populist”.
It is rare for politicians to describe themselves as populist and the label is often used pejoratively, despite being extensively and increasingly used by the media. The term is not used with its pejorative connotation in this article.
Much of today’s focus on populism is understandably on the US. Firstly, because the US is the world’s most important economic power. Secondly, because the new US government is unequivocally right-wing economically and socially and is therefore the paradigm of the rise of right-wing populism around the world. When considering the implications of political change and the rise of populism on the world of work, Donald Trump’s politics are, therefore, particularly important.
What is populism?
Populism is not easy to define but can be said to be anti-pluralist – based on being the one true voice of the people against elites and minorities. Left-wing populists tend to be opposed to big business and capital owners as the outsiders. Right-wing populists tend to see immigrants and minorities as well as a cosmopolitan elite as the outsiders. There are, however, exceptions which highlight the complexity in pigeon-holing parties and politicians.
| Right-wing populist parties | Left-wing populist parties |
|---|---|
| Share traditional / authoritarian / nationalistic values although they vary as far as their economic policies are concerned. | Share a disdain for free market globalisation but can be found at both ends of the spectrum on their social policies |
Our article in 2019 on populism and employment law considered what populism meant and what impact it was having on employment and employment law. We consider whether this has changed below.
Is there a global rise in right-wing or left-wing populism?
The populism which has been attracting increasing support across much of Western Europe and North America is generally described as far-right populism (see tables charting the rise of right-wing populism in Western Europe and the UK). The US Republicans under Trump are unashamedly populist. They consistently attack a so-called Washington elite and represent the epitome of a traditional/authoritarian/nationalist party. They promote a deregulatory agenda not seen in most of Western Europe’s right-wing populists
Globally, however, the position is somewhat different - with Canada, Australia and New Zealand, for example, only seeing negligible support for populist politicians.
Across Latin America, there is a tradition of left-wing populism. In Mexico, for example, after the 2024 elections, President Claudia Sheinbaum governs with her Morena populist left party in coalition with the Greens and the Labour Party.
Elsewhere, high-profile right-wing populists have lost some support in elections in recent years in some of the World’s largest democracies. In India, Narendra Modi remained in power after the 2024 elections but only in coalition with other right-wing parties after losing 60 seats. In Türkiye’s 2023 elections, Recep Erdoğan’s ruling party lost 27 seats but remained in power in coalition with other far-right and conservative parties. In Brazil’s 2022 Presidential elections, the left-wing Lula da Siva beat the incumbent populist right-wing leader, Jair Bolsonaro.
The position is more mixed in Eastern Europe which has more of a history of right-wing populism than Western Europe. Victor Orbán remains one of the most high-profile populist leaders having been Hungary’s Prime Minister since 2010. Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico is often referred to as a left-wing populist. While he is clearly at the traditional/authoritarian/nationalist end of the spectrum with pro-Russian, anti-migrant and anti-LGBTQIA+ policies, he highlights the difficulty of pigeon-holing today’s politicians as he is also often compared to Orbán despite his more left-wing economic policies.
The potential for sudden increases in support, reportedly on the back of the power of social media, has been seen in Romania’s recent elections where the country saw unexpected increases in support for far-right populist parties.
On the other hand, in Poland, Donald Tusk’s centre-right Civic Platform Party has advanced liberal/internationalist/progressive policies in coalition with other centrist parties, having defeated the incumbent right-wing populist Law and Justice Party in the 2023 legislative elections.
The impact of demographics on voting behaviours
Demographic divides are opening in voting behaviours. Age, gender and education are, arguably, replacing class distinctions which were historically indicative of voting patterns. Women, the young and the more highly educated are left-wing and more liberal/progressive/internationalist whereas men, the middle-aged and the less highly qualified are more likely to support right-wing populists with traditional/authoritarian/nationalist policies (see our table charting the voting preferences in recent elections in the US, France and the Brexit referendum).
Other emerging political forces
Right-wing populism is not the only political force with potential to impact on the traditional centrist political consensus.
Across Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand other political forces have to date had much less impact than rising support for right-wing populism. However, it is entirely foreseeable that voters will look elsewhere (potentially to the left, the libertarian right or green politics) if right-wing populism fails to address their economic woes and their feeling of increased exclusion.
Populist left
Arguably, left-wing parties are, by definition, populist in that they see themselves as representing the people against the capitalist elite. The populist left is, however, less likely than the populist right to espouse traditional/authoritarian/nationalist policies.
Further support for a potential leftwards shifts in the future could be brought about through young people being more left-wing than older generations with a tendency for progressive/liberal/international values. As their personal and family circumstances change, the question is whether younger voters will adopt the politics of older generations, or will their values stay with them? It is difficult to envisage that their social values will change fundamentally. If that is the case, it is not difficult to see this leading to increased support for left-wing and green politics in the years ahead.
While support continues to be high in several places in the Global South (e.g. Mexico, Sri Lanka, Brazil), the far-left remains of limited force across Europe. However, as well as demographic forces, support in recent years in France and the UK hint at the possibility of increased support in the years ahead.
France not only has one of the highest levels of support for the populist right but also for left-wing parties. In France’s last legislative election in 2024, the left-wing France Insoumise joined forces with the centre-left Socialists, the Greens and the left-wing Communists. This group garnered 28% of the vote in the first round of elections and more seats in the second round than any other grouping or party. In the 2022 Presidential election, the France Insoumise candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon received over 20% of the first round vote, only narrowly behind Marine Le Pen.
France Insoumise combines populism and left-wing economic policies with certain internationalist/liberal/progressive policies, for example, championing migrants’ rights and pro-green policies.
The UK Labour Party dallied with a left-wing manifesto with Jeremy Corbyn as leader in the 2017 and 2019 general elections and, although less popular in 2019, received 40% of the popular vote in 2017.
Elsewhere in Western Europe, the populist left-wing Five Star Movement gained around 15% of the vote in the last Italian legislative election and left-wing parties generally get between 5% and 10% of the vote across the Nordic nations.
Left-wing Podemos came third in the 2015 Spanish election with 21% of the vote. Its vote share has declined since, as it has come into conflict with other left-wing parties in the country. In the last legislative election, its vote share nonetheless equalled the right-wing populist Vox Party.
In Greece, Syriza, a left-wing populist party, was briefly in power in 2015. Its popularity has also waned since its high point and in the last election in 2023 when they came second with 18% of the vote.
Podemos and Syriza share France Insoumise’s pro-migrant rights, pro-minority rights politics.
Left-wing populists are not, however, always liberal/progressive/internationalist. Italy’s Five Star movement is unashamedly anti-migrant, anti-LGBTQIA+. An interesting development in Germany has seen the populist left BSW Party gain support. The party was only set up in January 2024 and explicitly combines traditional/authoritarian/nationalist social policies including being anti-immigration; rolling back on diversity initiatives; and pro-Russia with left-wing economic policies including being anti-globalisation and free market and pro-welfare and workers’ rights. The BSW has been polling as high as 10% in recent opinion polls for the next general election.
Libertarian right
The libertarian right shares neoliberal free-market, low tax, deregulation economic policies with other right-wing parties but promotes liberal social policies based on individual liberties so departs from many far-right populist parties.
Javier Milei‘s La Libertad Avanza Party in Argentina is probably the best-known libertarian party with Milei having triumphed in the 2023 presidential election. Milei’s policies are undoubtedly right-wing on the economic axis, but his libertarian values do not fall squarely with the traditional/authoritarian/nationalistic right nor with the anti-pluralism of populism.
Though many countries in Europe, North America and Australia/New Zealand feature libertarian parties, they generally have minimal support and no representation nationally. Two exceptions are the ACT Party in New Zealand and the Liberal Alliance Party in Denmark. Both secured around 8% of the national vote at the last legislative elections giving them 10 and 14 seats respectively in parliament.
Greens
Over the last few years, the rise of Greens has generally stuttered but with every climate catastrophe, it may only be a matter of time before we see their resurgence. Notwithstanding this relative decline, Greens have been governing as minor partners in coalitions in several European countries including Ireland, Germany and Norway. However, their role as minor coalition partners seems to have tarnished them with the curse of incumbency. In November’s elections in Ireland, Greens lost all but one seat and with the German coalition collapsing in November, Greens are forecast to do poorly in the country’s next legislative election.
Plotting green policies on the axes, shows green parties are generally anti-populist, left-wing on the traditional economic axis and progressive/liberal/internationalist on the social values axis without embracing the same approach to unfettered free market globalism as other parties but with strong progressive/liberal/internationalist values.
